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Abstract—Motivated by the immutable nature of Ethereum
smart contracts and of their transactions, quite many approaches
have been proposed to detect defects and security problems before
smart contracts become persistent in the blockchain and they are
granted control on substantial financial value.
Because smart contracts source code might not be available,
static analysis approaches mostly face the challenge of analysing
compiled Ethereum bytecode, that is available directly from the
official blockchain. However, due to the intrinsic complexity of
Ethereum bytecode (especially in jump resolution), static analysis
encounters significant obstacles that reduce the accuracy of
exiting automated tools.
This paper presents a novel static analysis algorithm based
on the symbolic execution of the Ethereum operand stack that
allows us to resolve jumps in Ethereum bytecode and to construct
an accurate control-flow graph (CFG) of the compiled smart
contracts. EtherSolve is a prototype implementation of our
approach. Experimental results on a significant set of real world
Ethereum smart contracts show that EtherSolve improves the
accuracy of the execrated CFGs with respect to the state of the
art available approaches.
Many static analysis techniques are based on the CFG rep-
resentation of the code and would therefore benefit from the
accurate extraction of the CFG. For example, we implemented
a simple extension of EtherSolve that allows to detect instances
of the re-entrancy vulnerability.
Index Terms—Reverse engineering, Static analysis, Smart con-
tract, Ethereum
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart contracts are a recent extension to cryptocurrencies
(e.g., Ethereum) that allows programs to be stored in the
blockchain and to be executed by the distributed network of
miners. Thus, a smart contract is a self-executing program that
runs on a blockchain [1].
The most peculiar feature of a smart contract is that the pro-
gram and all its transactions are immutable, i.e., once written
to the distributed blockchain, they cannot be updated, even in
case of programming defects identified after deployment [2].
Programming defects and vulnerabilities might result in frauds
or in financial values of cryptocurrencies that are frozen for-
ever [3]. Hence, code review, possibly supported by automated
analysis tool, is crucial to detect programming errors and
vulnerabilities before defective smart contracts are used or
erroneous transactions are committed and permanently stored
in the blockchain. This is especially critical for closed source
smart contracts, whose source code can not be inspected by
a client, and the only available representation is the compiled
bytecode [4].
The accuracy of static analysis is one of the key points to
promptly deploy and run correct smart contracts. However,
tools from the state of the art for detecting programming
defects and vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts experi-
ence substantial limitations, and their results contain worrying
amount of false positives (false alarms) and false negatives
(overlooked problems) [5]. A potential explanation for such
poor performance could be the intrinsic difficulty of analysing
Ethereum bytecode. In fact, despite the bytecode is easy to
parse (fixed length opcodes) [6] its semantics and control-
flow graph (CFG) are difficult to reconstruct due to specific
language design choices:
• Jump destination is not an opcode parameter, but a jump
opcode assumes the destination address to be available
on the stack, dynamically computed by previous code;
• There is no opcode for returning from functions: return is
implemented by pushing the return address to the stack,
and then performing a jump;
• Functions are removed by the compiler. Intra-contract
function calls are replaced by jumps. Inter-contract func-
tion calls are resolved by a dispatcher at the smart
contract entry point, that decides what address to jump
to, depending on the call’s actual parameters;
• The smart contract constructor is executed only once,
when the contract is initially deployed in the blockchain
and then discarded. Thus, the constructor bytecode is not
available in the blockchain [7].
The accurate extraction of the CFG from the bytecode is at
the basis of the success of many static analysis algorithms. In
this paper we focus on the extraction of the CFG from the
Ethereum bytecode. To this end, we propose a static analysis
approach, called symbolic stack execution, that resolves jump
destinations based on the symbolic execution of the operand
stack. After jump destinations are resolved, an accurate CFG
can be built. This approach has been implemented in Ether-
Solve1 [8], [9]: a fully automated tool that provides a benefi-
cial starting point for any sophisticated static analysis meant
1The tool is available on github.com/SeUniVr/EtherSolve/tree/ICPC-2021
to identify programming defects or vulnerabilities. Indeed,
starting from the results of EtherSolve, we implemented a
component to detect occurrences of re-entrancy vulnerability
in Ethereum smart contracts. This detector turns out to be
comparable or superior to state-of-the-art security scanning
tools.
The paper is structured as follows. After covering the
background of smart contracts in Section II, the different
phases of our analysis are described in Section III. Section IV
presents our empirical validation and comparison with state
of the art tools. Then, Section V discusses related work and
Section VI closes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Ethereum is a global, open-source platform for decentralised
applications, based on a blockchain technology. On Ethereum
network, it is possible to write simple programs, called smart
contracts [1], [10], [11], that control the cryptocurrency called
Ether (ETH) [12]. The actions that can be performed in
Ethereum are basically transactions, i.e. movements of funds
or data between different accounts. Every new transaction is
irreversible and it is permanently added in a new block that




mapping(address => uint256) private balances;














Listing 1: Solidity code example
Solidity is the most widely spread programming language
for Ethereum: it is an object-oriented, high-level and Turing-
complete language for implementing smart contracts [10],
[14].
Solidity contracts are basically objects with functions and
fields. The example in Listing 1 reports a smart contract
written in Solidity to implement a bank. The field balances
stores the internal state of the smart contract. It is a key-
value map that associates every address to an integer value
that represents the funds own by the address. The functions
deposit and deposit100 allow the user to deposit currency into
its virtual account. The former allows to deposit an arbitrary
amount, the latter is a special case which allows to transfer
exactly 100 Wei (10−16 Ether). The withdraw function allows
the user to get back a certain amount of Ether previously
deposited. Solidity provides different primitives to interact
with the blockchain environment: transfer sends Ether to a
certain address, revert makes the transaction fail and roll back
to the state prior to the transaction, require enforces a certain
boolean condition and in case the condition is not met it
performs a revert, and many others not shown in the example.
B. Compiling Solidity into Ethereum Bytecode
Before running a smart contract in the Ethereum blockchain,
Solidity source code needs to be compiled to Ethereum byte-
code to be executed by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
Constructor. The Solidity compiler, namely solc, generates
the creation code. This is the constructor of the smart contract
that performs the initial operations and deploys the runtime
code on the blockchain; the constructor code is then discarded
and not stored in the blockchain [7], [15].
Runtime Code. The runtime code can be divided into three
main segments. The first segment contains the opcodes that
the EVM executes; the second one is optional and contains
static data (e.g., strings or constant arrays); the last segment
contains the metadata, such as compiler version and different
hashes of the code. The structure of metadata has been
continuously changing through the different versions of the
Solidity compiler.
Application Binary Interface. The Solidity compiler emits
also the Application Binary Interface (ABI). This file contains
the list of the functions in the smart contracts that can be
called by a user, together with type and number of parameters.
Functions are not identified by their name but by the hash of
the signature. The ABI file is not deployed in the blockchain
and it needs to be distributed separately as it contains the main
information for interacting with a smart contract.
Stack. The stack is the main memory of a smart contract,
it is a volatile LIFO queue with 1024 blocks of 32 bytes [10],
[15]. The execution relies heavily on it, as arithmetic and
logic operations follow the reverse polish notation, where the
data are loaded into the stack before the operation [16]. For
instance, the bytecode 6005600301 is parsed into PUSH1
0x05 PUSH1 0x03 ADD, and the EVM execution will (i)
push a byte to the stack containing the value 0x05; (ii) push
the value 0x03 and then (iii) execute the addition operation,
which consumes two elements from the stack and leaves their
sum as result, leaving the final stack with only the value 0x08.
Opcodes. The complete list of opcodes with their semantics
is defined in Ethereum’s yellow paper [6], and there can be








Listing 2: Bytecode example
PUSH1 0x80 PUSH1 0x40 MSTORE PUSH1 0x4 CALLDATASIZE
LT PUSH2 0x34 JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 CALLDATALOAD PUSH1
0xE0 SHR DUP1 PUSH4 0x140E9AC7 EQ PUSH2 0x39 JUMPI
...
PUSH1 0x0 KECCAK256 PUSH1 0x0 DUP3 DUP3 SLOAD ADD
SWAP3 POP POP DUP2 SWAP1 SSTORE POP POP JUMP INVALID
Listing 3: Opcodes example
Listing 2 shows a portion of the Solidity smart contract com-
piled into bytecode, while Listing 3 shows the translation of
the bytes into EVM opcodes. Ethereum bytecode can be easily
parsed into opcodes, which are the minimum instructions that
the EVM can execute and are identified with a byte.
Every opcode pushes or pops a certain number of elements
from/to the stack, and it can either access memory, get
information about the execution environment or interact with
other blockchain smart contracts. The only opcodes with a
parameter are those in the PUSH family: the value that the
EVM pushes into the stack is taken directly from the bytes
following the opcode. There are different variants of PUSH,
depending on the number of bytes that needs to be pushed to
the stack, varying from PUSH1 (1 byte is pushed) to PUSH32
(32 bytes are pushed) [6], [15].
A portion of the code can be used as read-only data; in fact
with the CODECOPY opcode the execution can copy a portion
of the code to the memory and then treat it as data. [17].
Thus, parsing this segment of memory as code might generate
spurious results, including invalid opcodes and wrong jump
destinations.
Control flow opcodes. The control flow of the program is
managed through the stack. In fact, in order to jump among
different portions of the code both the JUMP and the JUMPI
opcodes (unconditional and conditional jumps) read the jump
destination from the stack. These destinations are not managed
with labels, but with the offset of the next instruction in the
code [17]. Unlike x86 assembly, in the EVM there is no
concept of function: everything is managed through jumps,
and there are neither opcodes for function call nor for return
from function call. The only return available is for function
calls coming from external smart contracts.
These design decisions make the EVM bytecode difficult
to analyse statically. In particular, since jump destination
are computed at run time, the CFG cannot be reconstructed
without a sort of stack simulation whose precision directly
affects the accuracy of extracted CFG.
Dispatcher. When a transaction starts the execution of a
smart contract, it can send both funds and information as call
data. In order to transfer the control to the code corresponding
to the intended function, the compiler adds a dispatcher at
the beginning of the contract code. When a caller is willing
to execute a certain contract function, it sends a transaction
that contains the hash of the function signature, so that the
dispatcher can compare it with all the hashes of the smart
contract functions and then take the execution to the begin of
the corresponding function code. Instead, if no call data are
supplied or none of the hashes matches, the dispatcher takes
the execution to the beginning of the fallback function. This
function has no parameter and returns no value [10].
Every function call in the Solidity contract is translated by
the compiler into a sequence of PUSH opcodes, followed by a
JUMP and a JUMPDEST. This sequence loads into the stack
the return address of the calling context, the (optional) actual
parameters and the address of the function to call. Then JUMP
executes the function body, that eventually consumes the pa-
rameters from the stack, leaving the return address which, once
executed, brings the execution to the JUMPDEST, resulting
in an actual return statement. In the following sections we
provide a simple example of this pattern.
C. Re-entrancy Vulnerability
Re-entrancy is one of the most prominent vulnerabilities
in Solidity, because it was exploited by the infamous DAO
incident [3] that caused serious consequences to the whole
Ethereum network. This vulnerability consists in re-entering
a paying function multiple times while the contract is in an
inconsistent state, thus causing possible leak of funds [5].
This vulnerability might be present when a contract state
update follows (instead of preceding) a fund send primitive
(i.e., a call). An example of vulnerable contract is shown
in Listing 4, where the call statement at line 7 precedes the
update of variable bank at line 8.
1 contract Bank {
2 // Mapping of money owned by an address
3 mapping (address => uint) bank;
4 // Function to withdraw money
5 function withdraw (uint amount) public {
6 require(amount <= bank[msg.sender]);
7 if (msg.sender.call.value(amount)(""))
8 bank[msg.sender] -= amount;
9 }
10 }
Listing 4: Re-entrancy example
III. STATIC ANALYSIS
EtherSolve [8] aims at extracting the CFG from the byte-
code of Ethereum smart contracts. The CFG is a directed graph
representing the flow of execution: nodes are the program’s
basic blocks (sequence of opcodes with no jumps, other than in
the last opcode) and edges connect potential successive basic
blocks.
A. Approach Overview
The static analysis implemented in our approach is com-
posed of the following steps:
• Bytecode parsing: The binary representation of the
Ethereum bytecode is split between code and metadata;
the code is then parsed to identify opcodes;
• Basic blocks identification: Opcodes are grouped in basic
blocks and the easier jumps between basic blocks are
resolved;
• Symbolic stack execution: The execution stack is subject
to symbolic execution in order to resolve the more
difficult jump destinations;
• Static data separation: The static data segment is sepa-
rated from the actual executable code;
• CFG decoration: The so obtained CFG is decorated to
highlight the dispatcher and to identify the entry point of
the fallback function.
Fig. 1: Example of control-flow graph.
In the following, we describe these steps in details referring
to the deposit100 function of the SimpleBank smart contract
in Listing 1.
B. Bytecode Parsing
The analysis starts with the raw bytecode. The metadata
section is identified by finding the respective header reported
in the official documentation [10]. In case of metadata with
experimental features, the header is different and not docu-
mented. We inferred the header structure of non documented
experimental cases by manually inspecting the bytecode of
some contracts. The version of the Solidity compiler used to
compile the bytecode is extracted from the metadata.
The metadata are then dropped and the remaining bytes are
considered as actual code and parsed by the EtherSolve parser
module. An example of how bytecode is parsed into opcodes is
shown in Listing 2 and Listing 3, where every two characters
of the bytecode are translated into the respective opcode (e.g.
0x6080 becomes PUSH1 0x80 and so on). Each opcode is
univocally identified by its offset address.
C. Basic Block Identification and Pushed Jumps
A basic block is a sequence of opcodes which are executed
consecutively between a jump target and a jump instruction,
without any other instruction that alters the flow of control.
Thus, opcodes that alter the control flow of the program divide
the code into basic blocks. Opcodes JUMP, JUMPI, STOP,
REVERT, RETURN, INVALID, SELFDESTRUCT mark the
end of a basic block, whereas JUMPDEST marks the beginning
of a new basic block. Every basic block is uniquely identified
by its offset, i.e., the position of its first opcode in the
bytecode. In Fig. 1 we can see the basic blocks of the code
in Listing 3 extracted following this procedure. Indeed, each
basic block either starts with a JUMPDEST or ends with an
opcode which alters the control flow.
Once the code is divided into basic blocks, we proceed with
the computation of the edges. This operation is not always
simple as the jump destination is not an opcode parameter
but it is available on top of the stack at execution time. We
identified two types of jumps: pushed jumps and orphan jumps.
A pushed jump is a JUMP immediately preceded by a PUSH
opcode, so that its target is easy to resolve, just by looking
at the value in the preceding PUSH opcode. Orphan jumps
instead are not preceded by a PUSH and their target is not
immediate to compute. In the example CFG of Fig. 1 the
block 53 ends with an orphan jump whereas the remaining
jumps are pushed jumps.
We start by computing the edges of pushed jumps. To this
end, each basic block is analysed according to its last opcode:
• JUMP preceded by a PUSH: the argument of the push is
the destination offset of the jump and the corresponding
edge is added to the CFG.
• JUMPI preceded by a PUSH: the false branch goes to the
following block (in offset order), the true branch is the
argument of the push interpreted as destination offset for
the JUMPI. In this case the two corresponding edges are
added to the CFG.
• JUMP not immediately preceded by a PUSH: the resolu-
tion of the jump is not trivial and it needs to be resolved
through symbolic stack execution, described in III-D.
• REVERT, SELFDESTRUCT, RETURN, INVALID,
STOP: there are no successors as the control flow is
interrupted.
• In any other case the control flow proceeds with the basic
block in the next position in the bytecode.
At the end of this phase we have extracted a partial CFG
where the edges related to orphan jumps are still unresolved.
For example, the extraction of the CFG of the code in Listing
1 at this point is depicted by the basic blocks and continuous
edges of the CFG in Fig. 1, while the outgoing edge from the
basic block 53 has not been resolved yet.
D. Symbolic Stack Execution and Orphan Jumps
The most challenging step in the CFG construction is the
resolution of the destinations of orphan jumps. These jumps
are very common: for instance the Solidity compiler uses them
on return from function call. Indeed, between the function
entry point and the function exit point (i.e., the return), the
stack is heavily used by the function body to implement all the
desired features (arithmetic operations, calls to other functions,
transfer of funds).
The analysis consists in executing the stack symbolically:
the algorithm walks the partially built CFG executing only the
opcodes that interact with the jump addresses, updating the
Fig. 2: Symbolic stack execution
state of the stack accordingly, in such a way that the orphan
jump destinations can be found on the symbolic stack. Indeed,
the symbolic stack execution considers only the opcodes in
the PUSH, DUP and SWAP families, together with the AND
and POP opcodes. For every other opcodes the symbolic stack
pops and pushes “unknown” elements, as they do not deal with
the jump addresses.
In the example shown in Fig. 2 there is a simple piece
of code that has been executed symbolically to highlight the
procedure. In particular the ADD is not modelled in full detail,
but it simply consumes two elements and then generates a
single “unknown” value. The jump address instead is loaded
before the arithmetic operations, but it persists until the actual
JUMP opcode, so it can be resolved.
The symbolic stack execution handles the opcodes accord-
ing to the rules represented in the look-up Table I, where the
following notation is used:
• S: stack that can contain numeric values or “unknown”
to represent unknown values. We indicate the top of the
stack as position 0.
• α : Opcodes → N: function that associates to each
opcode the number of elements added to the stack.
• δ : Opcodes → N: function that associates to each
opcode the number of elements consumed from the stack.
The algorithm walks through the CFG using a DFS (Depth-
First Search) keeping a state of the stack for each basic block.
The following constraints have been enforced in order to avoid
infinite loops: an edge cannot be analysed more than once
with the same symbolic stack state, and there is a limit on
the number of elements to compare when checking for stack
equivalence.
Another important aspect is the fact that a function can be
called in different points in the code, resulting in different
symbolic stacks and different paths on the CFG. In order
to avoid infeasible paths (paths that real executions would
never traverse) when the DFS visit encounters a basic block
ending with a JUMP only its destination block, obtained by
the symbolic stack, is added to the DFS queue.
The detailed algorithm for solving orphan jumps is shown in
Algorithm 1. It starts at Line 2 by initialising variable V that
stores the edges that have already been analysed using stack
equivalence as described before (lines 20 and 27); an edge is
also labelled with the symbolic stack that has been used for its
symbolic execution (Cf. lines 19 and 26). Then, the queue Q
TABLE I: Look-up table for executeOpcode in Algorithm 1
Value Name δ α Stack
0x16 AND 2 1 S[1] = S[1] ∧ S[0];S.pop()
0x50 POP 1 0 S.pop()
0x60 PUSH1
... PUSHn 0 1 S.push(opcode.argument)
|opcode.argument| = n bytes
0x7f PUSH32
0x80 DUP1
... DUPn n n+ 1 S.push(S[n− 1])
0x0f DUP16
0x90 SWAP1
... SWAPn n+ 1 n+ 1 S[0], S[n] = S[n], S[0]
0x9f SWAP16
0x* O δ(O) α(O) S.pop() δ(O) times
S.push(unknown) α(O) times
used for the DFS is initialised at Line 5: it contains pairs with a
block and a symbolic stack. The first pair 〈CB,S〉 contains the
first block and an empty stack. Then, the algorithm proceeds
with the symbolic stack execution by iteratively repeating the
following steps until Q is empty:
• Lines 9-11: symbolically execute the opcodes of the basic
block and update the state of the symbolic stack according
to the look-up Table I.
• Lines 12-16: resolution of the orphan jump destination
with the newly updated symbolic stack. The target block
is added as a successor of the basic block under analysis.
• Lines 17-31: handle the update of the queue Q. If the
edge from the analysed basic block to the target one has
not been already analysed with the same stack then the
successor blocks are added to Q. If the last opcode is a
JUMP then only its target block is added to Q.
An example of the symbolic stack execution for the res-
olution of orphan jumps is shown in Fig. 3 and refers to a
portion of the program shown in Listing 3, whose CFG is
depicted in Fig. 1. The symbolic execution starts at the offset
36, which loads into the stack the value 0x29 after the value
0x27. Then, our approach symbolically executes the JUMP
opcode that, according to Table I, consumes a value. Next, the
symbolic execution of JUMPDEST leaves the stack unchanged
and then value 0x01 is loaded. Then, the execution proceeds
until the opcode at 129 following the look-up table, which
leaves an unknown value on the stack that is removed by the
POP. Finally, the opcode at 131 contains the orphan jump,
which can be resolved with the value pushed into the stack
back on offset 34. At this point the symbolic stack execution
can detect that the successor basic block is the number 39.
Eventually, we have resolved the target of all branches in
the CFG, so the dashed edge in Fig. 1 is added at the end of
this phase.
Algorithm 1 Resolve Orphan Jumps
1: function RESOLVEORPHANJUMPS(basicBlocks)
2: V ← Set() . Visited
3: CB ← basicBlocks.first . Current block
4: S ← SymbolicExecutionStack() . Stack
5: Q← Stack() . DFS queue
6: Q.push(〈CB,S〉) . DFS first element
7: while Q 6= ∅ do
8: CB,S ← Q.pop()
9: for op ∈ CB.opcodes do
10: S.executeOpcode(op) . with look-up table
11: end for
12: if CB.opcodes.last == JUMP then
13: NO ← S.peek . get next offset from stack
14: NB = basicBlocks[NO] . Next block
15: CB.addSuccessor(NB)
16: end if
17: if CB.opcodes.last 6= JUMP then
18: for suc ∈ CB.successors do
19: edge← 〈CB. offset, suc. offset, S〉





25: else if CB.opcodes.last == JUMP then
26: edge← 〈CB. offset, NO, S〉







Fig. 3: Symbolic stack execution for orphan jump resolution
E. Static Data Separation
The proposed approach proceeds with the removal of static
data (if present). EtherSolve searches for the first basic block
containing the instruction 0xFE, which is the designated
opcode for an invalid instruction. In fact, the Solidity compiler
uses this opcode to mark the end of the executable code
section and the beginning of the static data section. Thus, all
the opcodes from here on are removed from the graph, and
considered as static data and not as code. Then, the algorithm
proceeds by removing from the graph any basic block that is
not connected to the main graph, if any.
The static data detected are usually strings contained in the
source code or child contracts which are instantiated by the
main one through the opcodes CREATE and CALL. Even if in
principle we cannot be sure that the removed data is actually
data and not code, our experimental validation shows that our
approximation is very accurate.
F. CFG Decoration
In order to attach more information to the CFG that could
be relevant to an analyst or for a subsequent static analysis
(e.g., for vulnerability detection), EtherSolve tries to highlight
some relevant portions, such as the dispatcher, the fallback
function and the last basic block.
The dispatcher is the entry point of the smart contract, so it
is at the beginning of the bytecode. The dispatcher directs the
execution to the intended Solidity function and it manages
parameters and return values. The fact that the dispatcher
manages the return values is the key used for its detection.
In fact, the only basic blocks that contain instructions such as
RETURN and STOP are part of the dispatcher. This opcodes
cannot be present in other locations as they would manage
return values outside the dispatcher. Hence, the algorithm
considers as dispatcher every basic block with an address
lower then the address of these opcodes. In the example of
Fig. 1, the dispatcher blocks are highlighted in grey.
This approach is effective to identify both the linear dis-
patcher, used in the older versions of the Solidity compiler,
and the tree dispatcher, introduced in the latest versions of
Solidity in order to improve the dispatcher performance.
The detection of the fallback function entry point is more
difficult, because its structure has been changing continuously
across different versions of the Solidity compiler. The first
check of the dispatcher is the presence of call data and,
if missing, it moves the execution to the Fallback function.
Hence, the currently implemented technique starts from the
entry block searching for the highest offset successor; then its
successor with the highest offset is considered fallback only
if it does not end with a REVERT, otherwise that would mean
that the fallback function has not been declared or has been
declared with only the revert() statement. This approach
however does not work with some versions of solc due to
different compilation patterns.
The last step of the CFG decoration is the addition of an
artificial unique exit point, for all the basic blocks with no
successor. This could be useful for any static analysis that
applies afterwards. This particular basic block in the example
in Fig. 1 is the number 132.
G. Re-entrancy Detection
Ethersolve has been pipelined with a subsequent static
analysis meant to detect cases of the re-entrancy vulnerability.
The proposed approach is a scan of the CFG in order to detect
potential flows of execution where a SSTORE opcode (which
updates the contract state) is executed after a CALL opcode.
This pattern is considered unsafe if the contract address where
funds are transferred to by the CALL cannot be statically
determined by the symbolic stack execution. Indeed, in this
case the funds destination could be controlled by an attacker
who mounts an attack to exploit a re-entrancy vulnerability.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section we present the results of our empirical
validation of the accuracy of the CFG computed by Ether-
Solve. Three research questions guide the definition of our
experimental validation:
• RQ1: What is the success rate of EtherSolve when
analysing real-world smart contracts compiled with dif-
ferent versions of the Solidity compiler?
• RQ2: How does EtherSolve compare with existing ap-
proaches?
• RQ3: How precise is the re-entrancy vulnerability detec-
tion built on top of EtherSolve?
The first research question investigates the extent to which
EtherSolve can process instances of real smart contracts with
no errors. We are interested in verifying this on a wide range of
smart contracts directly taken from the blockchain. The second
one compares our approach with the state of the art. The
third research question compares the results of the re-entrancy
vulnerability detection based on EtherSolve with other existing
vulnerability detection tools.
A. Dataset
The empirical validation has been conducted using a dataset
of smart contracts obtained from the list of verified contracts
from Etherscan2. They are publicly available open source
smart contracts with information about compilation, deploy-
ment and transactions. From this list we have randomly ex-
tracted 1000 contracts3. Using Etherscan APIs, both bytecode
and relevant information have been downloaded, obtaining
for each smart contract its name, address, hash, deployment
date, bytecode length, compiler version and other information
that are not relevant for us. We enforced that smart contract
bytecode hashes are unique, so that in the dataset there are
no duplicates. Indeed, it is common practice to reuse existing
smart contracts, especially libraries and interfaces, and deploy
them multiple times in the blockchain at different accounts.
The average length of these smart contracts is 7 351 bytes,
the average transaction number is 337, the average balance is
9.6 × 1017 Wei, which corresponds to 1158$ (exchange rate
on 2021-01-17). As shown in Fig. 4.a, the compiler versions
varies on a wide range, focusing especially on the old versions.
This datum is crucial in order to assess that EtherSolve does
not assume a specific Solidity version (the compiler often
underwent dramatic changes) but our patterns are general and
work well across many different language versions.
B. Comparison Tools
Among the existing tools for smart contracts analysis, we
select for the comparison with EtherSolve the ones that: (i)
perform a static analysis at the bytecode level (no information
2Contracts have been download on 2020-06-10 [18]
3Using the standard random library in Python 3.7
Fig. 4: Compiler versions of dataset contracts (a) and success
rate for the different tools (b)
from the source code or ABI file), (ii) emit the CFG as output,
possibly using a (documented) specific running configuration
(e.g., a special command line flag). These criteria led us to
consider the following approaches:
• Oyente-EthIR: EthIR extends the Oyente framework and
performs a high-level analysis of Ethereum bytecode.
Oyente builds a CFG of Ethereum bytecode to detect
different kinds of vulnerabilities [19], [20].
• Octopus: analysis framework for Ethereum bytecode. It
starts from the bytecode and produces a CFG to support
reverse engineering and understand the internal behaviour
of smart contracts [21].
• Mythril: security analysis tool for Ethereum bytecode that
detects security problems in smart contracts. It does not
build a CFG, but a trace tree given by symbolic execution
and SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) solving [22],
[23], [24].
• Vandal: static analysis framework for Ethereum smart
contracts that decompiles bytecode to an intermediate
representation that includes the control flow of the
code [17], [25], [26].
• Gigahorse: a decompiler that transforms smart contracts
from EVM bytecode into a highlevel 3-address code
representation. The tool does not require the Solidity
source code [27], [28], [29].
We discarded other tools such as Securify2, Ethersplay,
Manticore and Slither because they analyse Solidity source
code instead of Ethereum bytecode; Evm cfg builder because
we did not find an easy way to make it emit the CFG; Jeb
and MythX because they are paid tools and Porosity because
it requires the ABI as input and also because the project
seems discontinued. Panoramix [30] was discarded because
it decompiles the code without building a CFG and it is a
discontinued project.
C. RQ1: Success Rate
EtherSolve manages to analyse all the smart contracts in the
dataset except three, obtaining a success rate of 99.7%. The
success rate is defined as the ratio between the smart contracts
analysed without critical errors and the size of the dataset. The
reason for these failures is that these three smart contracts do
not match the most common patterns generated by the Solidity
compiler. Indeed, one of them was written in Vyper rather
than in Solidity, another one was empty with length of zero
bytes and the last one has a unusual begin section that the tool
failed to parse. The compiler version of Solidity is correctly
identified by EtherSolve for all the solved contracts.
We measured the time spent by EtherSolve to parse the
bytecode, generate the basic blocks, solve orphan jumps and
decorate the CFG. The average time is about 3 seconds per
smart contract. For 930 smart contracts the analysis took less
than a second each, while there are 7 smart contracts that
needed more than a minute of computation, with a maximum
of 10 minutes, due to their huge dimension and the large
number of edges.
D. RQ2: Comparison with Existing Approaches
First of all we compared the approaches in terms of success
rate. We ran the tools on our dataset and we counted the
successful executions (no crash) and the non-empty CFGs
given in output. We also insert a reasonable timeout of 10
minutes per contract.
As shown in Fig. 4.b and in Table II, Mythril was able
to analyse almost all the smart contracts (997 out of 1000),
immediately followed by Vandal with 978 smart contracts
and by Gigahorse with 951 smart contracts. Octopus and
EthIR instead reached an error state on many smart contracts,
computing a CFG only for 504 and 212 smart contracts re-
spectively. Next we focused on the CFGs emitted by the tools,
starting with an automatic numerical comparison of nodes and
edges. Then, we proceeded with a manual inspection of the
anomalous cases.
For each smart contract in the dataset we adopt a common
representation for the outputs of the different tools. The chosen
representation is a JSON file that contains a list of nodes
(which represent the basic blocks), identified by their offset
and a list of edges, identified by a pair of offsets. For each
smart contract we count the number of nodes, the number of
edges and the differences in the numbers of nodes and edges
among the CFGs generated by different tools. To understand
if there are portions of the bytecode which are actually data
(static data, child contracts or compiler metadata) but that the
candidate tool wrongly interprets as code, we calculate the
number of nodes in the CFG generated by a candidate tool
that have a higher offset than the highest offset node obtained
by EtherSolve. The candidate tools have been executed in
Docker [31] containers for compatibility reasons.
In the manual analysis we focused on the smart contracts for
which the automatic analysis reported uncommon or anoma-
lous results. These are relatively few contracts with sensitive
differences in the number of nodes or edges between the CFG
extracted by EtherSolve and by the compared tool. To support
the manual analysis we implemented a script that generates a
diff graph, where the two CFGs are combined and the nodes
that are present only in the first or in the second graph are
highlighted in a different colour.
The results of both automatic and manual analysis are
discussed in the following. Table II contains a summary of
the automatic analysis, with the smart contracts successfully
analysed, the average number of both nodes and edges and the
average number of basic blocks in the static data segment. Ta-
ble III contains a subset of interesting/anomalous contracts that
TABLE II: Comparison with state of the art.
Success Rate Average Avg. Nodes Average
(/1000) Nodes Static data Edges
EthIR 212 139.4 51.6 150.3
Octopus 504 241.4 11.8 220.7
Mythril 997 4.0 8.5 3.1
Vandal 978 302.6 6.7 493.6
Gigahorse 951 245.4 1.2 288.7
EtherSolve 997 301.6 0 361.8




















have been subject to manual analysis. Since contract names are
not unique, contracts are identified by their addresses.
1) Oyente-EthIR: In most cases, when EthIR finds more
nodes than EtherSolve, they have very high offset (Cf. Ta-
ble II), so they are static data or metadata interpreted as code.
Instead, when nodes match, edges match too. Because of its
very low success rate (21%), we deemed not so interesting to
continue with a manual analysis of this tool results.
2) Octopus: Like EthIR, Octopus finds more blocks than
EtherSolve with a higher offset, so they are probably data
and not code. In the big majority of the cases, however,
Octopus finds very few edges, sometimes even zero edges
(Cf. Table II). During manual analysis, we discovered that
Octopus misses some patterns for the metadata separation, so
metadata are parsed as if it were code (Table III.a). Moreover,
in many cases, Octopus does not detect edges that should be
present according to source code (Table III.b). In some other
contracts, Octopus evaluates the bytecode as creation code,
thus it analyses only the second part starting with 60806040
(the most common begin sequence of a contract); however,
this part of the code is a child contract and not the main one,
so the computed graphs are completely different (Table III.c
and Table III.d).
3) Mythril: This tool is a particular case, as it does not
extract a CFG, but a trace tree from dynamic/symbolic analysis
in order to detect vulnerabilities. The output of this execution
trace is not directly comparable with the CFG computed
by EtherSolve. Nonetheless, indirect comparison can be per-
formed by checking if the EtherSolve CFG misses nodes
or edges that are found by the Mythril dynamic analysis.
This case would correspond to incompletenesses in the CFG
elaborated by EtherSolve.
In the 4% of the contracts, Mythril finds a bunch of
edges which are not detected by EtherSolve. In some cases,
Mythril adds some artificial basic blocks containing "0:
STOP" which are placeholders that do not come from the
analysed code, but they indicate the end of the execution trace
(Table III.e). Sometimes, basic blocks are not split when there
is a JUMPDEST in the middle, so there is a little discrepancy
in the edges, but the CFG is definitely compatible (Table III.f
and Table III.g). In some other cases, Mythril finds new basic
blocks and edges that are not part of the main contract, but
that are opcodes of a child contract created by the main one
(Table III.h). The child contract code is computed at runtime,
so the EtherSolve static analysis simply treats those bytes as
part of the static data segment.
4) Vandal: Vandal CFG has always one node more than
EtherSolve, which is the ending node with the INVALID
opcode. In the 36% of the solved contracts the edges match,
but in the remaining cases there are differences that we
analysed manually. In some contracts the basic blocks do
not match because Vandal does not support two opcodes
that have been added in the most recent versions of the
EVM [32]. In fact, the SELFBALANCE opcode is treated
as invalid by Vandal, obtaining a basic block break with no
outgoing edges (Table III.i and Table III.j). In many other
cases, Vandal detects a huge amount of edges. Probably, when
Vandal is not able to correctly compute the destination of
a jump, it conservatively assumes all the basic blocks as
possible successors (Table III.k). This hypothesis is supported
by the diff graph, which shows too many outgoing edges
for basic blocks that occur at the end of functions, probably
because the return address could not be computed accurately.
However, the number of call sites (that should correspond to
the number of return edges) is much smaller according to the
Solidity source code of these contracts. All in all, as shown
in Table II, the average number of edges found by Vandal is
significantly higher than EtherSolve, whereas the basic blocks
are reconstructed in a similar way.
5) Gigahorse: Gigahorse records a good success rate, it
is able to correctly analyse 95.1% of the samples. It tries
to identify the private functions inside the code, and the
computed CFG reflects this objective. Because of this strat-
egy, the conversion into the intermediate representation is
tricky; often its CFGs contain artificial blocks with the special
CALLPRIVATE statement, introduced by Gigahorse to mark
private function calls. Nevertheless, automatic comparison
records high similarity with EtherSolve, so we proceeded with
the deeper manual inspection.
For the contract shown in Table III.l, EtherSolve computes
a set of basic blocks that are unreachable from the contract
entry point, that might represent dead code. However, these
unreachable blocks are not present in the Gigahorse CFG.
Similar cases are Table III.m and Table III.n, where EtherSolve
finds more nodes and edges than Gigahorse; these elements
correspond to a portion in the middle of the bytecode which
has not been reported in Gigahorse’s CFGs. An opposite case
happens on the contract in Table III.o, where EtherSolve
identifies a set of blocks that are not reachable from the
contract entry point whereas, according to the Gigahorse CFG,
these blocks are reachable. Our speculation is that such basic
blocks (which have a higher offset) belong to a child contract
or to an internal library which is not a proper part of the
main contract (e.g. called via STATICCALL), and thus they
are skipped by EtherSolve (that only analyses intra-contract
calls).
E. RQ3: Re-entrancy Vulnerability Detection
In order to validate the effectiveness of the vulnerability
detector built on top of EtherSolve, we compared it with
the benchmark shared by Ghaleb and Pattabiraman [5]. The
benchmark consists in 50 Ethereum smart contracts whose
source code has been injected with re-entrancy vulnerabilities
coming from 42 code snippets. This benchmark has been used
by Ghaleb and Pattabiraman to compare the most prominent
vulnerability detection tools. While their comparison was per-
formed at source-code level, EtherSolve targets the bytecode
level, so these injected contracts have been compiled before
applying our analysis. While the original dataset consisted
of 50 files, each source file could contain more than one
contract and injected vulnerabilities could multiply in the
compiled contracts, because of the use of inheritance that
caused vulnerable code to be cloned from abstract contracts to
concrete ones. Additionally, abstract contracts do not produce
bytecode as they are not executable. Hence, to simplify the
analysis, we opted to scan only one compiled contract per
source file, i.e. the largest compiled contract, assuming that the
remaining contracts were only supporting libraries or abstract
contracts, whose CFGs were disconnected from the main one.
Another problematic aspect, acknowledged by Ghaleb and
Pattabiraman, is that the dataset already contained vulnerabil-
ities before SolidiFI injection, but they were not documented.
To gather comparable results, we considered only vulnera-
bilities added by SolidiFI injection, by running EtherSolve
before and after injection, and by keeping only those new
vulnerabilities that are detected by the second scan and not by
the first scan. Table IV shows the results of the comparison,
measuring the average number of detected vulnerabilities for
each sample by each tool and then computing the difference
with the average number of bugs injected by SolidiFI (~26.86).
The table highlights that EtherSolve is the second-best analysis
tool, immediately after Slither. After a deeper comparison with
the results given by these two top tools, we discovered that
EtherSolve misses some cases (due to the choice of analysing
only a single bytecode) whereas Slither often finds false
positives. Indeed, the samples where EtherSolve found false
negatives are smart contract obtained by multi-contract source
code. Moreover, EtherSolve is the only tool that analyses
TABLE IV: Summary of re-entrancy analysis comparison for
the different tools [5] and for EtherSolve







bytecode, thus having less information, so its results are
even more valuable: EtherSolve can successfully analyse even
closed-source smart contracts with high precision.
To confirm the precision of EtherSolve, we scanned all
the 42 code snippets that SolidiFI uses for the injection. The
EtherSolve analysis exactly detected all the 42 vulnerabilities,
with a precision of 100%.
F. Discussion
The results obtained in this experimental validation suggest
that EtherSolve is very effective in computing an accurate
CFG: it is able to work on a wide range of Solidity versions
and in almost all cases it computes an exhaustive graph.
The key point of our approach is the simplicity of the
symbolic stack execution, which is limited to only a tiny set
of opcodes, but which is capable of resolving the destinations
of orphan jumps. However, there are particular cases of very
complex or big smart contracts with peculiar structures for
which EtherSolve is not able to identify certain edges.
Among the compared tools, only Gigahorse showed an
accuracy similar to EtherSolve. However, they seems to be
complementary, because each one could solve cases that the
other one could not.
The results of the vulnerability detector suggest that Ether-
Solve is a powerful tool, and that can be easily extended to
support accurate subsequent static analyses based on a precise
CFG. Indeed, the performance of a simple reachability analysis
compares to those of state-of-the-art security scanning tools.
V. RELATED WORK
Over the last five years many tools have been developed to
analyse Ethereum smart contracts, with different approaches
and different objectives. A recent survey of them has been
written by Praitheeshan et al. [33].
Some tools analyse directly the bytecode, often trying to
build a CFG. Their approaches are very similar, as they try to
execute symbolically the code to create logic predicates which,
once resolved with a solver such as Z3 theorem prover [34],
can determine the destinations of the orphan jumps. Among
these tools there are Oyente [35], EthIR [19] and Octopus [21].
However, these tools aim at detecting vulnerabilities, and the
extracted CFG is only an intermediate output.
A slightly different approach is the one used by Vandal [17],
[25], which translates the bytecode into registry based oper-
ations, identifies the basic blocks and then tries to resolve
the jump address through a fixed point analysis. Even in this
case the CFG is only an intermediate output, as the target of
Vandal is the vulnerability analysis with the Souffle suite [36].
Our tool instead focuses on the CFG building, keeping the
symbolic stack execution as simple as possible, in order to
resolve the highest number of orphan jumps.
A related tool which extract a CFG is Jeb [37], which is a
professional decompiler with the ability to analyse Ethereum
smart contracts. However, it is closed source with a subscrip-
tion fee. Another decompiler is Porosity, one of the first tool
to analyse Ethereum bytecode, but it needed the contract ABI
too. Moreover it is discontinued since January 2018 [38].
A relevant decompiler is Gigahorse [27]–[29], a recent tool
which builds a CFG and tries to find internal function with
heuristics, obtaining an approximation of the original Solidity
source code. Another decompiler is Panoramix [30] which,
however, does not emit a CFG.
The wide majority of the Ethereum tools that performs
vulnerability analysis do not expose a CFG, or even they
do not extract it. Other tools instead do the analysis on
the Solidity source code, or use the bytecode together with
additional information that are not always available for closed
source contracts. A completely different approach is the one
implemented by Mytril, which uses symbolic execution, SMT
solving and taint analysis to detect a variety of security vul-
nerabilities [23]. It does not build a CFG, but a trace tree, i.e.
a representation of all the execution paths encountered during
the analysis. Its objective is to detect as many vulnerabilities as
possible. Crytic [39] is an application that collects many tools
for smart contract analysis, such as Manticore, Ethersplay,
Echidna, Slither and more, but they do not use a CFG or
they do not analyse only the bytecode. In fact their objective
is the vulnerabilities detection inside the Solidity source code.
Finally, there are other tools such as Securify2 [40], which
analyse Solidity source code, Maian [41], which performs
dynamic analysis on a private blockchain, and Gasper [42],
which analyse the gas cost of the contracts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite it would be very important to automatically analyse
smart contracts and detect potential defects and vulnerabil-
ities on their code, most of the existing analysis tools for
Ethereum bytecode come with some shortcomings and limita-
tions. For example, the accurate extraction of the CFG from
the Ethereum bytecode is very challenging due to engineering
decision on its infrastructure. We propose EtherSolve, a fast,
reliable and precise approach to compute an accurate CFG
from Ethereum bytecode. We believe that this CFG could
be the starting point for new static analysis tools that aim
at detecting defects and vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart
contracts, built on top of an accurate CFG, such as the
EtherSolve re-entrancy detector.
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analyzers,” in Computer Aided Verification, S. Chaudhuri and A. Farzan,
Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp. 422–430.
[37] Jeb - ethereum contract decompiler. [Accessed: 2020-07-27]. [Online].
Available: https://www.pnfsoftware.com/jeb/evm
[38] Comaeio. Github - porosity. [Accessed: 2020-07-20]. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/comaeio/porosity
[39] Crytic: continuous assurance for smart contracts. [Accessed: 2020-07-
20]. [Online]. Available: https://crytic.io/
[40] P. Tsankov, A. M. Dan, D. Drachsler-Cohen, A. Gervais, F. Buenzli,
and M. T. Vechev, “Securify: Practical security analysis of smart
contracts,” CoRR, vol. abs/1806.01143, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1806.01143
[41] I. Nikolic, A. Kolluri, I. Sergey, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Finding the
greedy, prodigal, and suicidal contracts at scale,” 2018.
[42] T. Chen, X. Li, X. Luo, and X. Zhang, “Under-optimized smart contracts
devour your money,” in 2017 IEEE 24th International Conference on
Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengineering (SANER), Feb 2017,
pp. 442–446.
